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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are professors of conflict of laws 
and civil procedure with expertise in the rules 
governing the determination of foreign law. They 
have a strong interest in the proper application of 
these rules by U.S. courts. The amici curiae are 
professors of conflict of laws and civil procedure: 
George A. Bermann, Walter Gellhorn Professor of 
Law and Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law at 
Columbia Law School; Pamela K. Bookman, 
Assistant Professor of Law at Temple University 
Beasley School of Law; Andrew Bradt, Assistant 
Professor of Law at the University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law; Stephen B. Burbank, David 
Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School; Kevin 
M. Clermont, Ziff Professor of Law at Cornell Law 
School; Zachary D. Clopton, Assistant Professor of 
Law at Cornell Law School; Laura E. Little, Charles 
Klein Professor of Law and Government at Temple 
University’s Beasley School of Law; Ralf Michaels, 
Arthur Larson Professor of Law at Duke University 
School of Law; Kermit Roosevelt, a Professor of Law 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; 
Louise Ellen Teitz, Distinguished Service Professor 
of Law at Roger Williams University School of Law, 
Bristol, Rhode Island; Christopher A. Whytock, 
Professor of Law at the University of California, 
Irvine, School of Law. A detailed list of amici and 
their qualifications is provided in the appendix.1 
                                            
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No 
counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in 









SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Second Circuit held that “when a foreign 
government, acting through counsel or otherwise, 
directly participates in U.S. court proceedings by 
providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the 
construction and effect of its laws and regulations, 
which is reasonable under the circumstances 
presented, a U.S. court is bound to defer to those 
statements.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 
837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016). This “bound-to-
defer” rule is incorrect and unwise. 
First, the “bound-to-defer” rule is inconsistent 
with basic American conflict-of-laws principles 
governing the determination of foreign law. It is 
inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
44.1’s broad authorization for U.S. courts to 
“consider any relevant material or source” when 
determining foreign law. It is inconsistent with the 
principle that determinations of foreign law should 
be accurate. And it is inconsistent with the principle 
of judicial independence in the determination of 
foreign law. 
Second, the “bound-to-defer” rule is 
inconsistent with foreign and international practice. 
In most other countries, information about foreign 
law is not binding on courts. Moreover, the world’s 
two main treaties on the interpretation of foreign 
law expressly provide that information supplied by 
                                                                                         
part, and no person other than amici or their counsel has made 
any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 









foreign governments in accordance with those 
treaties is not binding on courts. Simply put, foreign 
governments do not expect each other’s courts to be 
“bound to defer” to each other’s interpretations of 
foreign law, much less the interpretation of one 
executive agency of a foreign government. 
Third, there are important reasons why 
deference principles should be kept separate from 
the principles governing the determination of foreign 
law. The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule 
would inappropriately delegate to foreign 
governments power to influence the application of 
domestic law—and hence the implementation of 
domestic policy—in a wide range of cases in which 
the proper application of U.S. law depends on the 
determination of foreign law. In addition, 
international comity does not require U.S. courts to 
defer to foreign governments in the determination of 
foreign law. International comity is a traditional 
rationale for choice-of-law rules that require the 
application of foreign law as a rule of decision under 
specified circumstances. But in this case, foreign law 
is at issue because the application of U.S. law 
depends on the interpretation of foreign law, not 
because choice-of-law rules require the application of 
foreign law. Therefore, this case does not implicate 
the comity rationale for choice-of-law rules. 
Moreover, the concerns that animate comity 
doctrines are not the same as those that animate the 
rules governing the determination of foreign law. 
The former are concerned with the respect owed 
between governments, whereas the latter are 
concerned with ensuring that U.S. courts 
independently and accurately determine the content 









of foreign law. In fact, the “bound-to-defer” rule 
raises issues that are likely to pose significant 
comity concerns that the ordinary Rule 44.1 
approach avoids. U.S. courts can still address comity 
concerns—separately from their independent 
determination of foreign law. 
To be sure, U.S. courts should give respectful 
consideration to a foreign government’s statements 
about its law. But as a matter of law, a foreign 
government’s statements cannot be binding on U.S. 
courts. Instead, U.S. courts should accurately and 
independently determine the meaning of foreign law 
taking into account not only the foreign 
government’s own statements, but also other 
relevant information about that law. This 
independent approach is especially important 
when—as in this U.S. antitrust case and many other 
cases—the proper application of American law 
depends on a determination of foreign law. 
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S “BOUND-TO-
DEFER” RULE IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
BASIC AMERICAN CONFLICT-OF-LAWS 
PRINCIPLES. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 
authorizes U.S. courts to “consider any relevant 
material or source” when determining foreign law. 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is 
inconsistent with this broad authorization. The 
Second Circuit’s rule also is inconsistent with the 
basic American conflict-of-laws principles that U.S. 
courts should determine foreign law accurately and 
that they should do so independently. 









A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 44.1. 
Rule 44.1 authorizes courts to “consider any 
relevant material or source” when determining 
foreign law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Relevant material 
may include primary sources (such as constitutions, 
statutes, regulations, and court decisions), secondary 
materials (such as treatises and other books, legal 
periodicals, and other legal commentary on foreign 
law), and expert advice (such as expert opinions of 
lawyers, judges, and scholars). See WRIGHT & 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 9A FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2444 (3d ed.). 
The text of Rule 44.1 places no limitations on 
this broad authorization. Moreover, the official 
advisory notes to Rule 44.1 do not indicate that any 
exception was intended—even when a foreign 
government is one of the sources of information 
about foreign law. To the contrary, as the Rules 
Advisory Committee explained, Rule 44.1 provides 
that “the court is not limited by material presented 
by the parties; it may engage in its own research and 
consider any relevant material thus found.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules—1966. By authorizing U.S. courts to consider 
any relevant material or source, Rule 44.1 helps 
ensure that U.S. courts have the flexibility to obtain 
the information they need to determine foreign law 
accurately. See infra Part I.B; Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1966 (noting 
that “the rule provides flexible procedures for 
presenting and utilizing material on issues of foreign 









law by which a sound result can be achieved with 
fairness to the parties”). 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule 
would limit the authority that Rule 44.1 grants to 
the courts. By making foreign government 
statements binding, the Second Circuit’s rule would 
not allow U.S. courts to “consider any relevant 
material or source” when determining foreign law. 
Instead, whenever a foreign government makes 
statements about its law that are “reasonable under 
the circumstances,” U.S. courts would be required to 
determine foreign law according to those 
statements—regardless of the reliability of those 
statements, and regardless of other reliable and 
persuasive information that might compel a different 
determination. For example, the “bound-to-defer” 
rule would prevent a U.S. court from considering 
foreign legislative records or foreign judicial 
decisions that might undermine or provide 
perspective for the interpretation proffered by a 
foreign executive agency. Thus, the Second Circuit’s 
rule would effectively amend Rule 44.1 by creating 
an exception to Rule 44.1’s broad authorization in 
cases in which foreign governments provide 
information about foreign law. Any amendment to 
Rule 44.1 should be made pursuant to the federal 
rulemaking process. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 et seq. 
The Second Circuit attempts to avoid this 
conclusion by reasoning that “Rule 44.1 explicitly 
focuses on what a court may consider when 
determining foreign law, but is silent as to how a 
court should analyze the relevant material or 
sources. Thus, courts must still evaluate the relevant 









source material within the context of each case.” In 
re Vitamin C, 837 F.3d at 187. But this reasoning 
cannot be reconciled with the “bound-to-defer” rule. 
If a foreign government’s statements were binding 
on a U.S. court, consideration of other material 
would be meaningless, for it would not be allowed to 
influence the court’s determination, even if that 
material is highly accurate and reliable. Rule 44.1, 
after all, calls for courts to “consider” relevant 
sources. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining consider as “to 
think about carefully” as in “to think of esp. with 
regard to taking some action” or “to take into 
account”); WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th 
ed. 1948) (defining consider as “to think on with 
care”). At most, the Second Circuit’s rule would allow 
U.S. courts to consider other material for the narrow 
purpose of determining whether a foreign 
government’s interpretation is “reasonable under the 
circumstances presented”—but even with this 
qualification, the “bound-to-defer” rule would not 
allow courts to “consider any relevant material or 
source” for the fundamental purpose of determining 
foreign law accurately, as Rule 44.1 authorizes 
(emphasis added). 
To support its “bound-to-defer” rule, the 
Second Circuit relies on United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203 (1942). This reliance is misplaced. Most 
importantly, for the reasons just given, the Second 
Circuit’s reading of Pink as stating a “bound-to-
defer” rule is inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 44.1, which entered into effect in 1966, 
more than 20 years after Pink was decided. 









The Second Circuit discounts the impact of 
Rule 44.1. See In re Vitamin C, 837 F.3d at 188 
(“Rule 44.1 does not alter the legal standards by 
which courts analyze foreign law . . . .”). But by doing 
so it ignores the important consequences of Rule 
44.1’s adoption. As Wright and Miller explain: “The 
procedure for proving foreign law was changed 
substantially by . . . Rule 44.1. . . . Thus, the trial 
court’s freedom of inquiry no longer is encumbered 
by any restraint on its research or by the rules of 
admissibility . . . . Since the rule dissipates former 
inhibitions on judicial inquiry, the district judge may 
consider any material the parties wish to present.” 
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2444 (3d 
ed.). Rule 44.1 also abandoned the treatment of 
foreign law issues as issues of fact, and established 
that a determination of foreign law instead “must be 
treated as a ruling on a question of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—
1966 (“[T]he court’s determination of an issue of 
foreign law is to be treated as a ruling on a question 
of ‘law,’ not ‘fact’. . . .”). 
Moreover, Pink was an appeal from a New 
York state court, and both the state court and this 
Court applied New York state law to determine the 
content of foreign law in that case. See 315 U.S. at 
217-22 (discussing New York Civil Practice Act § 391 
and its requirement to treat certain “written 
authorities” as “presumptive evidence” of foreign 
law); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (calling for district 
courts, at the time of Pink, to apply state evidence 
law in some circumstances). One purpose of Federal 
Rule 44.1—and of the Federal Rules more 









generally—was to provide a uniform federal 
approach to questions of procedure, including the 
determination of foreign law. The first sentence of 
the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 
first version of Rule 44.1 stated: “Rule 44.1 is added 
by amendment to furnish Federal courts with a 
uniform and effective procedure for raising and 
determining an issue concerning the law of a foreign 
country.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules—1966 (emphasis added). The 
Notes further explained that the authorization to 
“consider any relevant material or source” was 
explicitly designed to end the reliance on variable 
and often undesirable state laws. See id.2 For 
reasons we explain shortly, we see no conflict 
between Pink and Rule 44.1. But even if there were 
a conflict, Rule 44.1 would control today.  
Furthermore, it is far from clear that Pink 
stands for the general proposition that U.S. courts 
are “bound to defer” to foreign government 
statements. Although this Court in Pink found a 
declaration of the Russian Commissariat for Justice 
                                            
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules—1966 (“Heretofore the district courts, applying Rule 
43(a), have looked in certain cases to State law to find the rules 
of evidence by which the content of foreign-country law is to be 
established. The State laws vary; some embody procedures 
which are inefficient, time consuming and expensive. In all 
events the ordinary rules of evidence are often inapposite to the 
problem of determining foreign law and have in the past 
prevented examination of material which could have provided a 
proper basis for the determination. The new rule permits 
consideration by the court of any relevant material, including 
testimony, without regard to its admissibility under Rule 43.”) 
(citation omitted). 









interpreting Russian law to be conclusive in the 
particular circumstances presented, this Court 
announced no rule in Pink requiring that foreign 
government statements be binding on U.S. courts in 
general. See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11 
(“This Court’s holding [in Pink] that the 
Commissariat’s declaration was ‘conclusive’ under 
those circumstances does not suggest that every 
submission by a foreign government is entitled to the 
same weight.”). 
Even if Pink is read as stating a general rule 
of deference—which it does not—it may be read as a 
conditional deference rule—not a categorical rule as 
suggested by the Second Circuit. See Pink, 315 U.S. 
at 220 (explaining that, prior to treating the 
declaration as conclusive, this Court determined that 
“the evidence supported [the] finding[] that the 
Commissariat for Justice has power to interpret 
existing Russian law”); id. at 218 (explaining that, 
although this Court “[did] not stop to review all the 
evidence in the voluminous record” on the question 
of Russian law, it accepted the stated interpretation 
only after observing “that the expert testimony 
tendered by the United States gave great credence to 
its position”). Thus, Pink arguably stands only for 
the proposition that courts may treat foreign 
government statements about foreign law as 
conclusive if evidence shows that the foreign 
government agency making the statement is 
authorized to interpret foreign law and there are 
other persuasive sources or materials that are 
consistent with that interpretation.  









B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
PRINCIPLE THAT U.S. COURTS 
SHOULD ACCURATELY 
DETERMINE FOREIGN LAW. 
A basic principle governing the determination 
of foreign law under Rule 44.1 is that courts should 
determine foreign law accurately. See Rationis 
Enterprises Inc. v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 
F.3d 580, 586 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Ultimately, the 
responsibility for correctly identifying and applying 
foreign law rests with the court.”); see also Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to 
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-
Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 728 (1967) 
(“Rule 44.1 expresses a philosophy that federal 
courts should ascertain foreign law accurately 
whenever possible.”). The accurate determination of 
foreign law requires that it be considered in light of 
how it is authoritatively interpreted and applied in 
the foreign country. See de Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 
F.3d 992, 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that the 
issue of French law governing remedy was “not a 
simple matter of translation” but “requires a broader 
look at French law to understand the nature of the . . 
. remedy” and how it functions in France, including 
an inquiry into how the remedy is actually used in 
the French legal system); Bodum USA, Inc. v. La 
Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Wood, J., concurring) (arguing that court’s 
understanding of foreign law should not be merely 
“theoretical” but instead should take into account 
“day-to-day realities of the practice of law” in the 
foreign state). The approach of the Second Circuit 









effectively reverts to treating foreign law as a 
question of fact in which a foreign government’s 
statement is accepted as “truth,” ignoring Rule 44.1’s 
directive to weigh the available information. See 
Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (“Since foreign law is an issue of law rather 
than of fact, it is not the credibility of the experts 
that is at stake, but rather the persuasiveness of 
their opinions.”). 
The principle of accuracy implies that a court 
must consider information about foreign law based 
on how reliable and persuasive the information is. 
See Bodum, 621 F.3d at 628 (majority opinion) 
(“Judges should use the best of the available 
sources.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2444 
(3d ed.) (“[O]ne of the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 
is that whenever possible issues of foreign law 
should be resolved on their merits and on the basis 
of a full presentation and evaluation of the available 
materials. To effectuate this policy, the court is 
obliged to take an active role in the process of 
ascertaining foreign law.”). 
Reliable and persuasive information may, of 
course, come from a foreign government. But being a 
foreign government agency or official is not by itself 
a sufficient indicator of reliability and 
persuasiveness, because the reliability and 
persuasiveness of foreign government statements 
depend on many other factors. These include: (1) 
whether the specific agent of the foreign government 
making the statement about foreign law is 
authorized to officially interpret that law; (2) 









whether the statement is consistent with the same 
agent’s earlier statements; (3) whether the 
statement is consistent with those made by other 
agents of the foreign government; (4) whether the 
statement is consistent with how the foreign 
government’s courts have interpreted that law; (5) 
whether the statement is consistent with 
information about that foreign law from other 
reliable sources; (6) how well-supported the 
statement is by primary sources of foreign law; (7) 
how well-reasoned the statement is; (8) the context 
and purpose of the statement; and (9) whether the 
statement will be binding in any future proceedings 
in the foreign state or in a U.S. court. See Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari at 8 (“The precise weight to be 
given to a foreign government’s statement turns on 
factors including the statement’s clarity, 
thoroughness, and support; its context and purpose; 
the authority of the entity making it; its consistency 
with past statements; and any other corroborating or 
contradictory evidence.”).  
Foreign court decisions are generally likely to 
be more reliable and persuasive sources of 
information about foreign law than information 
provided to U.S. courts by executive agencies of 
foreign governments in the context of pending U.S. 
litigation—but U.S. courts are not “bound to defer” 
to foreign court decisions, either.3  
                                            
3 Although the conflict-of-laws rules governing foreign 
judgments ordinarily provide that U.S. courts should generally 
recognize and enforce those judgments, there are numerous 









The pitfalls of relying on a statement about 
foreign law solely because it is provided by a foreign 
government agency are illustrated in United States 
v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). In that 
case, defendant was convicted of violating the Lacey 
Act, which is a U.S. statute that prohibits the 
importation of “fish or wildlife [that has been] taken, 
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any 
foreign law.” Id. at 1232 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
3372(a)(2)(A)). Defendant’s conviction was based on 
a violation of Honduran law. Id. at 1232-34. The 
district court relied on statements of multiple 
Honduran officials, including a legal officer of a 
Honduran government ministry made during the 
investigation and trial, that the relevant law was 
valid. Id. at 1234-35. But after defendant’s 
conviction, the Embassy of Honduras filed an amicus 
brief in support of defendants, arguing that the law 
“was of no force and effect, because it was not 
adopted in accordance with Honduran law and thus 
it could not legally provide the basis for any violation 
of Honduran law.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Embassy of Honduras and the Asociacion de 
Pescadores del Caribe in Support of Defendant-
Appellant David Henson McNab, 2002 WL 
32595268, at *13. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that it would not defer to the 
new Honduran position. McNab, 331 F.3d at 1242. 
The Eleventh Circuit insisted that “[w]e must have 
                                                                                         
grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement. See, e.g., 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 
4, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%2
0money%20judgments%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf. 









consistency and reliability from foreign governments 
with respect to the validity of their laws.” Id. 
A fundamental flaw of the Second Circuit’s 
“bound-to-defer” rule is that it would prevent courts 
from independently weighing information about 
foreign law in accordance with these and other 
available indicia of reliability and persuasiveness. 
The Second Circuit’s rule would require courts to 
determine foreign law in accordance with a foreign 
government’s statements even if those statements 
have a lower degree of reliability or persuasiveness 
than other information before the court. Indicia of 
reliability and persuasiveness would only matter if 
they so clearly tilted against a foreign government’s 
statements as to render them not “reasonable under 
the circumstances.” In re Vitamin C, 837 F.3d at 
189. The principle behind the determination of 
foreign law, however, is to arrive at an accurate 
determination, not merely a reasonable one. 
This flaw is especially serious at the appellate 
level. As the Second Circuit correctly observed, “[t]he 
determination of foreign law is ‘a question of law, 
which is subject to de novo review.’” Id. at 183. A 
primary purpose of de novo review is to ensure that 
an appellate court can correct a district court’s 
inaccurate determination of the content or meaning 
of foreign law. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 753 F.3d 239, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(undertaking “de novo review of the district court’s 
interpretation of foreign law”) (emphasis added); 
Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“Just like any question of law, ‘[t]he content of 
foreign law is a question of law and is subject to de 









novo review.’”) (quoting Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 713 (5th Cir.1999)) 
(emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, Notes 
of Advisory Committee on Rules—1966 (“[T]he 
court’s determination of an issue of foreign law is to 
be treated as a ruling on a question of ‘law,’ not ‘fact,’ 
so that appellate review will not be narrowly 
confined by the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of Rule 
52(a).”); John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, 
Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American 
Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 3, 6 n.12 (1983) 
(“[A]ssurance of the correctness of the content and 
application of foreign law requires the supervision of 
appellate review.”). Yet the Second Circuit’s review 
was based more on deference than accuracy. As the 
Second Circuit itself states: “[I]f the Chinese 
Government had not appeared in this litigation, the 
district court’s careful and thorough treatment of the 
evidence before it in analyzing what Chinese law 
required . . . would have been entirely appropriate.” 
In re Vitamin C, 837 F.3d at 191 n.10. 
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE 
VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN 
LAW. 
The bedrock principle of judicial independence 
applies to all determinations of law by U.S. courts, 
including determinations of foreign law. See Garcia 
v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 2015) (“‘[I]n 
determining these questions of [foreign] law, both 
trial and appellate courts are urged to research and 
analyze foreign law independently.’ This is because 









‘one of the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 is that 
whenever possible issues of foreign law should be 
resolved on their merits and on the basis of a full 
evaluation of the available materials.’”) (citations 
omitted); de Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 997 
(9th Cir. 2016) (stressing “the district court’s 
independent obligation to adequately ascertain 
relevant foreign law”); PNC Financial Services 
Group, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 F.3d 119, 126 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (“[Rule 44.1] direct[s] courts to independently 
determine issues of foreign law.”). 
The principle of independence means that a 
U.S. court cannot be required to defer to information 
given to it by others, but may instead engage in its 
own independent research on foreign law. See 
Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209, 1216 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“‘[F]ederal judges may reject even the 
uncontradicted conclusions of an expert witness and 
reach their own decisions on the basis of 
independent examination of foreign legal 
authorities.’”) (quoting Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 713 (5th Cir. 
1999)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules—1966 (noting that under Rule 
44.1 the court “may engage in its own research and 
consider any relevant material thus found”); see also 
Products and Ventures International v. Axus 
Stationary (Shanghai) Ltd., 2017 WL 201703, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2017) (“[A] district court has an 
‘independent obligation’ to ascertain the relevant 
foreign law. . . . Thus, courts must . . . determine 
whether submissions from parties are sufficiently 
reliable.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2444 









(3d ed.) (“[F]ederal courts have not felt bound by the 
testimony of foreign law experts and upon occasion 
have placed little or no credence in their opinions 
when not supported adequately or when the views 
were offered in too partisan a fashion.”); cf. Intel 
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. , 542 U.S. 241 
(2004) (characterizing European Commission as a 
“tribunal” despite an amicus brief from the 
European Commission arguing that under European 
Union law the European Commission did not 
function as a tribunal). 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule 
violates the principle of judicial independence in two 
ways. First, it would impose on U.S. courts a 
particular interpretation of foreign law—that of an 
appearing foreign government—rather than allowing 
U.S. courts to determine foreign law independently 
based on indicia of reliability and persuasiveness 
such as those discussed above. Second, the “bound-
to-defer” rule would render meaningless the 
authority Rule 44.1 gives courts to do independent 
research on foreign law. The Second Circuit’s 
“bound-to-defer” rule thus would be just the sort of 
“judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the 
judicial duty” to interpret law that has raised 
concerns in other contexts. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. 
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J.). In this case, the bound-to-defer rule 
would require adopting the Chinese ministry’s 
statement even though the trial court found that 
“the plain language of the documentary evidence 
submitted by plaintiffs directly contradicts the 
Ministry’s position.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 









II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH FOREIGN AND 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. 
The Second Circuit’s bound-to-defer standard 
is inconsistent not only with basic American conflict-
of-laws principles, but also with foreign and 
international practice. Foreign courts are not 
subjected to the “bound-to-defer” rule that the 
Second Circuit would impose on U.S. courts, and 
treaties on the determination of foreign law show 
that foreign governments do not expect that sort of 
deference from each other. Indeed, the fundamental 
principles of accuracy and independence in the 
determination of foreign law that underpin Rule 44.1 
are widely recognized in foreign and international 
practice. 
A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH FOREIGN 
PRACTICE. 
The Second Circuit’s bound-to-defer rule 
would impose a more rigid rule of deference on U.S. 
courts than foreign countries impose on their own 
courts. As the United States has stated in this 
litigation, the Department of Justice “is not aware of 
any foreign-court decision holding that the 
Department’s representations are entitled to such 
conclusive weight.” Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
11-12. 
The United States’ assessment is consistent 
with a recent study of how 34 nations in Europe, 









North and South America, the Asia-Pacific Area, and 
Africa treat foreign law, which found that the large 
majority of these nations do not require their courts 
to be bound by information about foreign law. See 
Yuko Nishitani, Treatment of Foreign Law: 
Dynamics Towards Convergence?—General Report, 
in TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE? 26 (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017) 
(“Information obtained with respect to foreign law is 
not binding in most jurisdictions. . . . The judge 
needs to examine the quality of the obtained 
information in court proceedings, possibly by using 
additional materials. In light of this, it is sensible 
policy to exclude the binding force of any information 
provided in relation to foreign law.”); id. at 30 (“The 
effects of the information on foreign law provided by 
expert witnesses, documents submitted by the 
parties or any other means is not binding on the 
judge.”); see also Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Foreign 
Law in National Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 
304 RECUEIL DES COURS 281, 287 (2003) (surveying 
Germany, France, England, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and 
a variety of Latin American countries, and 
concluding that in those jurisdictions “the court is 
not bound by the information or ‘evidence’ [regarding 
foreign law] delivered by the parties, but remains 
free to assess its reliability and sufficiency”). For 
example: 
 In Germany, “[t]he provided legal 
information never is binding on the 
court. Rather, the court retains its 
responsibility under [the German Code 
of Civil Procedure] and has to evaluate 









the information rendered.” Oliver 
Remien, Germany: Proof of and 
Information About Foreign Law–Duty 
to Investigate, Expert Opinions and a 
Proposal for Europe, in TREATMENT OF 
FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE? 183, 203 (Yuko 
Nishitani ed., 2017).4  
 In France, a statement about foreign 
law “is subject to adversarial debate 
and it is not binding upon the judge 
who has to verify, among other things, 
the impartiality” of the statement. 
Sabine Corneloup, France–The 
Evolving Balance Between the Judge 
and the Parties in France, in 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS 
TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? 157, 171 
(Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017).5  
                                            
4 See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], 
§ 293, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/ 
89715/103136/F-842321361/ZPO.pdf, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html (“The laws 
applicable in another state, customary laws, and statutes must 
be proven only insofar as the court is not aware of them. In 
making inquiries as regards these rules of law, the court is not 
restricted to the proof produced by the parties in the form of 
supporting documents; it has the authority to us other sources 
of reference as well, and to issue the required orders for such 
use.”).  
5 See Code de procédure civile, art. 246, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=
8B6C6B1B7107BAED721D0D2D0500A511.tplgfr27s_1?idArticl









 Spanish law provides that “[n]o report 
or opinion, national or international, on 
foreign law, shall be binding for 
Spanish courts.” Carmen Azcárraga 
Monzonís, Spain: The Application of 
Foreign Laws in Spain–Critical 
Analysis of the Legal Novelties of 2015, 
in TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: 
DYNAMICS TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? 
329, 333 (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017).6 
 In Switzerland, “[l]egal information on 
foreign laws is not binding on Swiss 
judicial authorities.” Ilaria Pretelli & 
Shaheeza Lalani, Switzerland: The 
Principle Iura Aliena Novit Curia and 
the Role of Foreign Law Advisory 
Services in Swiss Judicial Practice, in 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS 
                                                                                         
e=LEGIARTI000006410377&cidTexte=LEGITEXT0000060707 
16&dateTexte=20050514, translation at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/ 
1962/13735/.../Code_39.pdf (“The judge is not bound by the 
findings or conclusions of the expert.”). 
6 See Ley 29/2015, de 30 de julio, de cooperación jurídica 
internacional en materia civil, BOE-A-2015-8564, art. 33.4, 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2015-8564, 
translation in Carmen Azcárraga Monzonís, Spain: The 
Application of Foreign Laws in Spain–Critical Analysis of the 
Legal Novelties of 2015, in TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: 
DYNAMICS TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? 329, 333 (Yuko Nishitani 
ed., 2017) (“No report or opinion, national or international, on 
foreign law, shall be binding for Spanish courts.”). 









TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? 375, 390 
(Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017).7  
 In Japan, “[t]he legal information 
provided is not binding upon the 
judicial authorities. Instead, they are 
obliged to investigate and assess the 
reliability of the information submitted 
ex officio.” Shunichiro Nakano, Japan: 
Proof of and Information About Foreign 
Law in Japan, in TREATMENT OF 
FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE? 529, 533 (Yuko 
Nishitani ed., 2017). 
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is 
also inconsistent with the world’s two most 
important international treaties on the 
interpretation of foreign law: the European 
Convention on Information on Foreign Law, June 7, 
1968, 720 U.N.T.S. 154, which has 46 parties,8 and 
the Inter-American Convention on Proof of and 
Information on Foreign Law, May 8, 1979, 1439 
                                            
7 See Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO], [Civil 
Procedure Code] Dec. 19, 2008, SR 272, art. 157, translation at 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/20061121/index.html (“The court forms its opinion 
based on its free assessment of evidence taken.”). 
8 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/062/signatures?p_auth=GlHMAlNF. 









U.N.T.S. 111, which has 12 parties.9 Both treaties 
allow the courts of a party to request information 
about foreign law from a designated foreign 
government official. But even when there is a formal 
request and foreign government reply in accordance 
with the treaty process, a court is not bound to defer 
to the foreign authority’s reply. European 
Convention, art. 8 (“The information given in the 
reply shall not bind the judicial authority from 
which the request emanated.”); Inter-American 
Convention, art. 6 (“[Parties] shall not be required to 
apply the law, or cause it to be applied, in 
accordance with the content of the reply received.”). 
These treaties “confirm that the court of appeals’ 
rule is out of step with international practice.” Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari at 12 n.2. 
These treaties show that foreign countries do 
not expect each other’s courts to be bound to defer. 
To the contrary, these foreign countries are 
concerned that a binding approach would violate the 
principle that courts should independently 
determine foreign law. As the official Explanatory 
Report on the European Convention explains, the 
rule providing that foreign government statements 
are not binding “was inserted in order to stress the 
desire of the Convention to respect the courts’ 
independence.” Council of Europe, Explanatory 
Report to the European Convention on Information 
on Foreign Law, June 7, 1968, at 6, available at 
https://rm.coe.int/16800c92f3. See also Yuko 
                                            
9 See General Information of the Treaty, 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-43.html. 









Nishitani, Treatment of Foreign Law: Dynamics 
Towards Convergence?—General Report, in 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE? 56 (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017) (“[T]he 
large majority of national reporters argue that the 
reply should not be binding upon the judge . . . , 
although this is not a unanimous view. . . . [T]he 
reply ought to remain non-binding to allow the judge 
to examine the reliability and accuracy of the 
provided information and, if it is imprecise or 
incorrect, conduct further research into the content 
of foreign law by referring to other sources.”). 
The United States is not a party to either of 
these treaties. However, the United States has 
officially expressed its view to the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law that any future 
convention on foreign law should likewise provide 
that the views of foreign government authorities are 
not binding on receiving courts. See Response of the 
United States of America to Feasibility Study on the 
Treatment of Foreign Law Questionnaire, Prel. Doc. 
No 25 (Oct. 2007), Response to Question 29(c) 
(answering “YES” to the following question: 
“Should the information received be non-binding 
(as opposed to binding)?”), available at 
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd09us.pdf
. 
III. DEFERENCE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT 
BE PART OF THE DETERMINATION OF 
FOREIGN LAW.  
A rule requiring deference to foreign 
government statements about foreign law would not 









only undermine the accuracy and independence of 
U.S. legal judgments, but also have the effect of 
delegating to foreign governments power to influence 
the application of domestic law—and hence the 
implementation of domestic policy—in a wide range 
of cases in which the proper application of U.S. law 
depends on the determination of foreign law. 
Moreover, international comity does not require that 
U.S. courts be bound to defer to foreign government 
statements about foreign law. While the ordinary 
Rule 44.1 approach to issues of foreign law is 
unlikely to raise comity concerns, a “bound-to-defer” 
approach may raise such concerns.  
A. A RULE REQUIRING DEFERENCE IS 
INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE IT 
WOULD ALLOW FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENTS TO UNDULY 
INFLUENCE THE APPLICATION OF 
U.S. LAW. 
The proper application of American law 
frequently depends on the determination of foreign 
law. For example, foreign law determines whether 
foreign corporations have the capacity to sue and be 
sued in U.S. courts; defendants in breach of contract 
cases may plead a defense of supervening foreign 
illegality; domestic statutes may create liability for 
conduct in violation of foreign law; the protection 
against self-incrimination may apply to potential 
foreign prosecutions; courts manage civil discovery 
in light of foreign laws that affect potential 
compliance; extraterritorial service of process in 
federal court is permissible as prescribed by the 
foreign country’s law; foreign laws may be relevant 









to venue questions in U.S. courts; laws creating 
exceptions for double taxation require an assessment 
of whether foreign tax liability attaches; resolution 
of various types of disputes requires determination 
of the validity of a foreign marriage; and—as in this 
case—foreign law determines whether a party can 
successfully raise the defense of foreign sovereign 
compulsion. See Zachary D. Clopton, Judging 
Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (2016) 
(collecting sources and other examples); see also The 
Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 520, 593-97 (1841) (Story, J.) 
(applying this Court’s independent interpretation of 
Spanish law to free captured slaves and to reject as 
evidence of their ownership the “public documents of 
the [Spanish] government” that accompanied the 
vessel).  
In these situations the determination of 
foreign law fundamentally influences the application 
of domestic law and hence the implementation of 
domestic policy. It is therefore crucial that U.S. 
courts retain the authority to independently 
determine foreign law in these cases. 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule 
would inappropriately delegate this authority from 
U.S. courts to foreign government actors by 
requiring that U.S. courts defer to the 
determinations of foreign government actors 
appearing in U.S. court and by barring U.S. courts 
from independently determining foreign law as they 
are authorized to do under Rule 44.1. This 
delegation would allow foreign governments to 
influence the application of American law in a wide 
range of cases—even though foreign governments 









lack the same interest as U.S. courts in ensuring the 
proper application of American law. The Second 
Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule would have this effect 
whenever the application of American law depends 
on the determination of foreign law and a foreign 
government decides to submit an official statement 
interpreting that law. For example, the Second 
Circuit’s rule would seem to permit a foreign 
government to intervene in any case against a 
foreign corporation and conclusively declare that 
corporation not capable of being sued in a U.S. court. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2) (“Capacity to sue or be 
sued is determined . . . for a corporation, by the law 
under which it was organized . . . .”). See also United 
States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“[I]t is not difficult to imagine a Lacey Act 
defendant in the future, who has the means and 
connections in a foreign country, lobbying and 
prevailing upon that country’s officials to invalidate 
a particular law serving as the basis for his 
conviction in the United States. . . .There would 
cease to be any reason to enforce the Lacey Act, at 
least with respect to foreign law violations, if every 
change of position by a foreign government as to the 
validity of its laws could invalidate a conviction.”). 
In the antitrust setting, there are special 
reasons for U.S. courts to determine foreign law 
independently—and not simply defer to foreign 
government statements about foreign law. In some 
cases, statements may be submitted “to shield the 
foreign defendants from liability in the U.S., even if 
their conduct was anticompetitive.” Marek 
Martyniszyn, Foreign States’ Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases, 61 ANTITRUST 









BULL. 611, 630 (2016). It is neither surprising, nor is 
it disrespectful to foreign governments, to 
acknowledge that they, like the United States, will 
occasionally take litigation positions abroad to 
promote the interests of their nationals. See id. at 
641 (observing the possibility that “a [foreign] state 
participates as amicus before a U.S. court to meet 
expectations of some local constituencies or lobbying 
groups”); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 810 
F. Supp. 2d 522, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that 
Chinese ministry’s statement “does not read like a 
frank and straightforward explanation of Chinese 
law. Rather, it reads like a carefully crafted and 
phrased litigation position. . . . [A]ll of the points 
above suggest that the Ministry’s assertion of 
compulsion is a post-hoc attempt to shield 
defendants’ conduct from antitrust scrutiny rather 
than a complete and straightforward explanation of 
Chinese law. . . .”); see also infra Part III.B 
(discussing situations in which U.S. courts assess 
the motives of foreign governments).  
This is not to suggest that foreign government 
statements that are consistent with or motivated by 
foreign governmental interests, or the interests of 
foreign businesses, are submitted in bad faith. It 
merely means that judicial reliance on these 
statements will not necessarily further the principle 
of accuracy and could, in some cases, interfere with 
U.S. law and policy. 









B. INTERNATIONAL COMITY DOES 
NOT REQUIRE DEFERENCE TO A 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT’S 
STATEMENT ABOUT FOREIGN 
LAW. 
Respondent seems to suggest that the Second 
Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is necessary as a 
matter of international comity to ensure that U.S. 
courts give “proper respect” to the sovereignty of 
foreign countries. See Brief in Opposition at 26, 
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharmaceutical Co., No. 16-1220 (U.S. June 5, 2017). 
This is incorrect. International comity does not 
require deference to a foreign government’s 
statement about foreign law.10 
To be sure, international comity is one 
traditional rationale for choice-of-law rules that call 
for the application of foreign law as a rule of decision 
under specified circumstances. See Bank of Augusta 
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839) (“[T]he 
laws of one [country], will, by the comity of nations, 
be recognised and executed in another . . . .”); JOSEPH 
                                            
10 In other contexts, comity concerns have not prevented this 
Court from critically characterizing and rejecting foreign 
government positions in litigation. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Community, 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2108 (2016) (“refus[ing] 
to adopt” the position of the European Community and its 
member states, and referring to the position as a “double 
standard”); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign 
Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against 
“Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 678 et seq. 
(2016) (discussing numerous other cases in which U.S. courts 
rejected claims of foreign sovereigns instead of deferring based 
on comity doctrine).  









STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
38 (2d ed. 1841) (1834) (“[The] comity of nations . . . 
is the most appropriate phrase to express the true 
foundation and extent of the laws of one nation 
within the territories of another.”). 
But this case is different. This case involves 
the interpretation of foreign law, not its application 
as a rule of decision. And foreign law is at issue 
because the proper application of domestic law—
namely U.S. antitrust law and possible U.S.-law 
defenses to its application—depends on the 
determination of foreign law, not because choice-of-
law rules require foreign law to be applied. See 
supra Part III.A.11 Therefore, this case does not 
implicate the international comity rationale 
underlying choice-of-law rules. 
In addition, the concerns that animate the 
rules governing the determination of foreign law are 
fundamentally different than those that animate 
comity doctrines. The former are concerned with 
ensuring that U.S. courts independently and 
accurately determine the content of foreign law, 
whereas the latter are concerned with the respect 
                                            
11 Even in the choice-of-law context, international comity 
does not require deference. It is well established, for example, 
that a court may decline to apply foreign law that is “contrary 
to the strong public policy of the forum.” Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 90 (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see also STORY, 
supra, § 25, at 31 (“No nation can . . . be required to sacrifice its 
own interests in favor of another; or to enforce doctrines which, 
in a moral or political view, are incompatible with its own 
safety or happiness, or conscientious regard for justice and 
duty.”). 









owed between governments. See supra Part I. 
Comity considerations should therefore be kept 
separate from Rule 44.1 and other principles 
governing the determination of foreign law. 
To the extent that this Court is concerned 
about protecting international comity, nothing in 
Rule 44.1 undermines other doctrines that protect 
comity interests directly. There are many 
“international comity doctrines” that apply in U.S. 
courts, including the act of state doctrine, 
presumption against extraterritoriality, foreign state 
compulsion, recognition of foreign judgments, forum 
non conveniens, international comity abstention, 
antisuit injunctions, foreign discovery, foreign 
sovereign immunity, foreign official immunity, and 
the right of foreign governments to bring suits in 
U.S. courts. See generally William S. Dodge, 
International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071 (2015). These doctrines are distinct 
from the question before the Court in this case.12 
In any event, because the Second Circuit’s 
“bound-to-defer” rule is inconsistent with foreign and 
international practice, see supra Part II, it is 
unlikely that a foreign government could genuinely 
view a U.S. court’s respectful but independent 
                                            
12 Because the Second Circuit did not rule on Respondent’s 
act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign compulsion defenses, 
and because this Court decided not to review the Second 
Circuit’s decision to abstain on grounds of international comity, 
this Court should address only how foreign law should be 
determined and should not address how any of the 
international comity doctrines potentially implicated in this 
case should be applied. 









determination of foreign law as a violation of 
principles of international comity. 
More specifically, Respondent suggests that 
the Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is 
necessary to prevent U.S. courts from causing 
offense to foreign governments by speculating about 
foreign government motives. See, e.g., Brief in 
Opposition at 26, Animal Science Products, Inc. v. 
Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., No. 16-1220 
(U.S. June 5, 2017) (“The district court’s speculation 
about the Chinese government’s motives illustrate 
the problem.”). 
But there is nothing sacrosanct about 
government motives. See Clopton, supra, at 10-23 
(collecting examples of U.S. courts sitting in 
judgment of foreign governments, foreign laws, 
foreign legal acts, foreign legal systems, and foreign 
government interests). For example, in W.S. 
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 
493 U.S. 400 (1990), this Court held that dismissal of 
a suit under the act of state doctrine was improper, 
thus allowing the suit to proceed despite the District 
Court’s finding that the suit could “impugn or 
question the nobility of a foreign nation’s 
motivations.” Id. at 408-10. Moreover, in suits 
against foreign governments under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, U.S. courts may assess 
the legal liability of foreign governments, which, 
depending on the elements of the claim, may require 
courts to make findings about the purpose or intent 
of foreign government actions. Similarly, the 
possibility that determinations of foreign law may in 
some cases touch on foreign government motives 









should not interfere with U.S. courts’ ability to make 
those determinations accurately and independently. 
Indeed, requiring courts to defer to foreign 
government interpretations may put undue pressure 
on courts to rely on other comity doctrines. A court 
faced with a potentially unreliable foreign 
government statement should be able to 
independently evaluate the statement’s 
persuasiveness and then to explain honestly the 
basis of that independent evaluation. If a court were 
bound to defer to an unreliable statement, as the 
Second Circuit’s rule would require, then there is a 
risk that the court would be tempted to invoke 
abstention-like options that might not otherwise be 
appropriate. Cf. Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) 
(describing the “virtually unflagging obligation of the 
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them”).  
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S “BOUND-
TO-DEFER” APPROACH RAISES 
COMPLEX QUESTIONS OF 




Directing U.S. courts to defer to foreign 
government determinations of law sounds simple, 
but in fact this approach would raise challenging 
questions and would risk offense to international 
comity, thus undermining its chief justification. 









A rule that requires deference to certain 
foreign government statements implies that courts 
would have to decide which foreign statements 
receive this treatment. For example, U.S. courts 
would presumably have to determine which foreign 
government institutions are permitted to make 
authoritative statements about foreign law.13 This 
determination likely would require government-by-
government assessments, and may vary depending 
on the allocation of authority within each country 
(e.g., parliamentary versus presidential versus 
nondemocratic). The choice also could depend on 
whether the foreign law in question is judge-made 
law, legislation, executive order or decree, or 
administrative regulation. Courts would have to 
decide how to respond if the foreign government 
experienced a change in position (or leadership) 
between the underlying conduct and the litigation, 
or if two branches of a foreign government submitted 
conflicting determinations. And at least in some 
circumstances, the Second Circuit suggests that the 
“reasonableness” of foreign government statements 
may still be scrutinized. See In re Vitamin C, 837 
F.3d at 189. 
Asking courts to make these determinations is 
at least as likely to raise international comity 
concerns as the existing Rule 44.1 approach. Because 
the Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is 
inconsistent with foreign and international practice, 
                                            
13 In many cases, this authority might be sensibly assumed 
when the foreign government entity is a foreign country’s 
highest court; but the inquiry may be far more complex when 
foreign government entities other than courts are involved. 









it is unlikely that a foreign government could 
genuinely view a U.S. court’s respectful but 
independent determination of foreign law in 
accordance with Rule 44.1 as a violation of principles 
of international comity. See supra Part II. But under 
the Second Circuit’s approach, foreign governments 
could be offended when U.S. courts categorize some 
of their government actors as authoritative and 
others not, and some of their statements “reasonable 
under the circumstances” and others not.  
IV. U.S. COURTS SHOULD GIVE RESPECTFUL 
CONSIDERATION TO A FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENT’S STATEMENT ABOUT 
FOREIGN LAW, BUT THEY STILL MUST 
DETERMINE FOREIGN LAW 
INDEPENDENTLY.  
U.S. courts should give respectful 
consideration to a foreign government’s statements 
about its law. See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND 
THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 92 (2015) (“[O]ur Court does, and should, 
listen to foreign voices, to those who understand and 
can illuminate relevant foreign laws and practices.”); 
cf. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353 
(2006) (noting that the International Court of 
Justice’s interpretation of a treaty “deserves 
‘respectful consideration,’” but declining to be bound 
by that interpretation) (quoting Breard v. Greene, 
523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)). This 
respectful consideration is consistent with the 
principles of judicial independence and accuracy that 
underpin the determination of foreign law under 
Rule 44.1. 









Indeed, in some cases U.S. courts may find it 
helpful to actively seek information about foreign 
law from a foreign government. Efforts to clarify the 
process for foreign government participation in U.S. 
litigation should be pursued, and such participation 
should be encouraged. See, e.g., Communication to 
Courts, 1978 Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law ch. 4, § 1 at 560-63 (describing 
this Court’s efforts to encourage foreign governments 
to directly file amicus briefs rather than 
communicating to U.S. courts through the State 
Department). Efforts to formalize inter-court 
relationships seem especially promising. See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 1525 (providing for court-to-court 
communication in cross-border bankruptcy cases); 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Chief 
Justice of New South Wales and the Chief Judge of 
the State of New York on References of Questions of 




for cooperation between New York state courts and 
the courts of New South Wales in resolution of 
questions of the other’s law); see also Lehman 
Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) 
(praising the use of the formal certified-question 
procedure in domestic interjurisdictional cases). 
But a foreign government’s statements cannot 
be binding on U.S. courts. Instead, U.S. courts 
should accurately and independently determine the 
meaning of foreign law taking into account not only 
a foreign government’s own statements, but also 
other relevant information about that law, as 









expressly authorized by Rule 44.1. This independent 
approach is especially important when—as in this 
case and many other cases—the proper application 
of American law depends on the determination of 
foreign law. Cf. BREYER, supra, at 7 (“I do not ignore 
the basic fact that the American people can and 
must democratically determine their own laws.”). 
Just as U.S. courts should respectfully consider 
foreign government statements, foreign governments 
should respect the independence of U.S. courts when 
ruling on questions of law. 
The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule is 
unnecessary to promote the respectful consideration 
of foreign government statements about foreign law. 
Rule 44.1—which already authorizes the 
consideration of “any relevant material or source”—
and the principle of accuracy in the determination of 
foreign law, already ensure this. This case requires 
no more than reaffirming those basic principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should 
be reversed. 
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